Portion of Philadelphia Salary History Ban Ruled Unconstitutional

Q.  Am I permitted to ask about an applicant’s salary history in Philadelphia?

A.  In a ruling that could provide a roadmap for challenging salary history bans in other jurisdictions, a Philadelphia federal judge issued an opinion on April 30 invalidating a major element of the Philadelphia salary history ordinance enacted by the city in January 2017. Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg held that the portion of the ordinance prohibiting an employer from inquiring about a prospective employee’s wage history is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment’s free speech clause. However, Judge Goldberg also held that the portion of the law prohibiting employers from relying on wage history to determine a salary for an employee did not implicate constitutional concerns. Philadelphia employers now find themselves in a difficult position: They are permitted to ask about an applicant’s salary history but cannot rely on that information.

For more information, please click here.

Tracey E. Diamond and Lee E. Tankle

 

Got Employees in Massachusetts and New Jersey? What You Need to Know as MA and NJ Employers are Mandated to Break the Glass Ceiling

Q.  Are there any Equal Pay Acts that apply specifically to employers in Massachusetts and New Jersey?

A.  On July 1, 2018, an updated equal pay law becomes effective in Massachusetts, referred to as “MEPA” (Massachusetts Equal Pay Act). MEPA covers nearly all Massachusetts employers, irrespective of size, and most employees, including full-time, part-time, seasonal, per-diem, and temporary employees. Employees who telecommute to a primary place of work in Massachusetts also are covered.

The Massachusetts law provides that “[n]o employer shall discriminate in any way on the basis of gender in the payment of wages, or pay any person in its employ a salary or wage rate less than the rates paid to its employees of a different gender for comparable work.” “Comparable work” is not defined by an employee’s job title; rather, “comparable work” is work that requires substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility, and is performed under similar working conditions. For multistate employers, employees in the same “geographic location” within Massachusetts are to be paid equally for comparable work.  The statute does not define the term “geographic location.”

Employers can rely on one of the six permissible variations in pay for comparable work: (1) a system that rewards seniority with the employer; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, sales, or revenue; (4) the geographic location in which a job is performed; (5) education, training or experience to the extent such factors are reasonably related to the particular job in question; or (6) travel, if the travel is a regular and necessary condition of the particular job.

The State of New Jersey enacted legislation similar to the MEPA.  The Act, prohibits New Jersey employers from paying different salaries to employees based on any protected category, including sex, where the employees are engaged in “substantially similar” work.  Like Massachusetts, the effective date of the New Jersey statute also is July 1, 2018.

The phrase “substantially similar” work is not defined, other than a statement that it is to be viewed as a “composite of skill, effort and responsibility.” An employer in New Jersey may pay a different rate of compensation only if the employer demonstrates that the differential is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, or the employer demonstrates that: (1) the differential is based on one or more legitimate factors other than sex (or any other protected category), such as training, education or experience, or the quantity or quality of production; (2) the factors are not based on, and do not perpetuate a sex-based or other protected-category based differential in compensation; (3) each of the factors is applied reasonably; (4) one or more of the factors account for the entire wage differential; and (5) the factors are job-related with respect to the position in question and based on a legitimate business necessity. A factor based on business necessity shall not apply if it is demonstrated that there are alternative business practices that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential.

Both statutes significantly expand the reach of the concept of equal pay, by broadening the net of jobs used for comparison purposes to “comparable” (MEPA) or “substantially similar” (NJ). Both standards are somewhat vague and will need to be interpreted by the courts.  Employers in Massachusetts and New Jersey will have to evaluate their pay  structures carefully to comply with the law and to assess risks of actions under these statutes.

When MEPA becomes effective, employers with employees in Massachusetts not only will be unable to justify pay differential based on salary history, but also will not be permitted to ask for an applicant’s salary history prior to an employment offer, or seek such information through a recruiter. By contrast, the New Jersey ban on salary history questions, which was put in place by Executive Order effective February 1, 2018, applies only to employer that are state agencies.

Employers who violate either the Massachusetts or New Jersey laws will be liable for back pay and liquidated damages.

Rebecca Alperin and Tracey E. Diamond

 

 

 

 

Ninth Circuit Finds That Employers May Not Use Salary History to Justify Differences in Pay

Q.  Can my Company use an applicant’s salary history to set their current pay rate?

A.  Not for employees in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (covering California, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington).  In a case decided the day before Equal Pay Day, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that, in a claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act, salary history is not a defense to a claim of gender discrimination when a female employee complains that her salary is lower than that of  her male counterpart.

For more details about this case, click here.

Hope A. Comisky and Tracey E. Diamond

 

UberBLACK Drivers Are Properly Classified as Independent Contractors

Q.  Have there been any new legal developments on whether gig economy workers can be classified as independent contractors?

A.  On April 11, Judge Michael Baylson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became the first judge to grant summary judgment on the issue of whether UberBLACK drivers are employees or independent contractors under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Judge Baylson concluded that Uber correctly classified the plaintiffs — drivers who provided “black car” limousine services for Uber — as independent contractors. Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573 (E.D. Pa. 2018). The plaintiffs intend to appeal. Although the analysis of independent contractor classification is fact-intensive and varies depending on the type of claim asserted by the plaintiffs, gig economy employers will find the Razak opinion helpful in structuring their independent contractor relationships.

For the full article, click here.

Susan K. Lessack

United States Supreme Court Revises Standard for Review of Exempt Classification

Q.  I heard that the U.S. Supreme Court just issued a ruling finding that auto service workers are exempt from overtime pay. My company is not in the automobile industry. Will this opinion apply to us?

A.  The U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion this week in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, finding that auto service workers – those employees who interact with customers and sell them services for their vehicles – are exempt from overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). While the decision directly impacts this small category of jobs, the opinion will have a much more far-reaching impact, since the Court rejected long-standing precedent that exemptions must be construed narrowly against the employer.

In a 5-4 opinion overturning the Ninth Circuit’s decision finding that auto service advisors were non-exempt, the Court expressly rejected the principle invoked by the Ninth Circuit and many courts before it that exemptions to the FLSA should be construed narrowly.  Instead, the Court observed that “[b]ecause the FLSA gives no textual indication that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, there is no reason to give them anything other than a fair (rather than a narrow) interpretation.” (internal quotations omitted).  The Court concluded that “exemptions are as much a part of the FLSA’s purpose as the overtime-pay requirement.  We thus have no license to give the exemption anything but a fair reading.”  Finally, the Court remarked, “even if Congress did not foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair reading.”

The dissent criticized the Court for rejecting the narrow construction principle for FLSA exemptions “[i]n a single paragraph . . . without even acknowledging that it unsettles more than half a century of our precedent.”

This is the second time that the Supreme Court ruled in this case. In 2016, the Court rejected a 2011 Department of Labor (DOL) regulation relied on by the Ninth Circuit in finding that service advisors were not exempt.  The Court noted in that opinion that the DOL had flip-flopped on the issue several times over the years.  In 1970, the DOL interpreted an exemption in the FLSA for automobile salesmen to exclude service workers.  The federal courts rejected this interpretation, however, and in 1978, the DOL issued an opinion letter agreeing with the courts that service advisors indeed were exempt.  In 2011, the DOL changed course again, issuing the regulation relied on by the Ninth Circuit that service advisors were not included in the exemption for salesmen.

In its 2016 opinion, the Supreme Court found that the 2011 regulation was not entitled to any deference because the DOL had issued it without a sufficiently reasoned explanation. The Court remanded the matter to the Ninth Circuit to consider the meaning of the statutory language without the regulation.  On remand, the Ninth Circuit again held that the service advisors were not exempt, and the case went back up to the Supreme Court, where it was overturned in last week’s opinion.

What This Means for Employers

This new standard – that exemptions should be given a “fair reading” – is a win for employers, as it should now be easier for companies to persuade courts that an employee’s job duties fall within one of the categories for exempt status under federal law. Prior to this ruling, an employer was unable to overturn the presumption of non-exempt status unless it could demonstrate that an exemption “plainly and unmistakably” applied.  Now, it is more likely that employers will be able to convince a federal court that the exemption applies if it is supported by a fair reading of the text.

Employers must continue to be mindful of state court interpretations of their overtime laws, however, which may construe their corresponding overtime exemption more narrowly than the SCOTUS interpretation.

–Tracey E. Diamond